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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

ROYAL RESOURCES, INC.
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

No. 15817

GIBRALTER FINANCIAL CORP. ,
GIBRALTER SECURITIES CORP.,
(a wholly owned subsidiary of
Gibralter Financial Corp.),
LYNN DIXOH, and GEORGE PERRY,
Defendants-Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT LYNN DIXON

Pursuant to Rule 75(p)(l) and (2), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the appellant submits the following reply brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant calls to the Court's attention the following
facts:
That the material contained on Page 4 of respondent's brief
beginning with the last paragraph with reference to respondent's
investigation with appellant's counsel of the possibility of
recovery on behalf of the respondent the federal insurance
program (SCIPIC) was not set forth in the record.
The appellant Dixon provided the respondent with all
records of the defendant company which he had (Exh. 4-P and 5-P),
but could not provide respondent with other records since he
was not the custodian or otherwise in possession of such
records.

The respondent states that appellant was the
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-2President of Gibralter Securities Corp.

This was true at

one time, but not throughout the whole time respondent dealt
with the company, nor at the time the production order was
entered.

At that time, appellant Dixon was not an officer

of the company, and the company was in bankruptcy.

The

affidavit of the appellant in response to the discovery
motions and orders (

was specifically to the effect

that appellant had produced what he had the power to produce.
(

).

No motion was made pursuant to Rule 37(b), Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, for any special sanction against
the appellant.

None was appropriate since Rule 34, U.R.C.P.

requires that person have "possession, custody or control"
of the documents sought to be produced.
The action in the instant case was brought against the
appellant Dixon and expressly in his capacity as "registered
agent" of "Defendant Corporation". (R. 2)

The respondent's

amended complaint also referenced Dixon as "registered agent
of Defendant Corporation". (R. 9-10)

Although respondent

sought to hold Dixon responsible in his individual capacity
it was clear the respondent was moving against Dixon knowing
he was a corporate agent.
The respondent made demands for payment on the checks
from the corporation not Dixon.

(R.

).

Respondent sued

the corporation and took judgment first against the corporations (R. 24) and sought satisfaction of the judEment against
Gibralter, on the basis of a stipulation asking appellant's
cooperation, against the federal insurer SCIPIC.

The
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Securities, was clearly to the effect that respondent Royal
Resources and Dee Woolley did not have customer accounts
because they were not true securities customers.

(R. 80)

Respondent was actually in the loan business, and had to be
paid from general funds.

Respondent was not paid because

Gibralter was broke. (R. 79-81).

The funds due respondent

were from a sale of stock by a customer of Gibralter.
POINT I
RESPONDENT CANNOT BASE LIABILITY ON THE RIGHT
TO PIERCE THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE SO AS TO HOLD
APPELLANT LIABLE AS THE ALTER EGO OF THE CORPORATION.
In Point I of respondent's brief, it is recognized that in
circumstances like those involved in the instant case that an
agent may not be liable.

The respondent, however, asserts:

"It

is well established that under various circumstances the corporate
veil can be pierced to get at officers or directors when the
facts warrant the application of equitable principles to go
behind the corporate personality to the individual."
This is a new position urged by the respondent.

At no

time in this case has the respondent contended that it was
seeking to pierce the corporate veil.

Indeed, respondent's

complaint expressly recognized the appellant as an agent for
the corporate defendants.
recital of the facts.
in this case.

This is acknowledged in the respondent's

The doctrine of alter ego is not applicable

This case involves a corporation with which

respondent had done business on a number of occasions and which
had an existence separate and· apart from Lynn Dixon.

Respondent

made demands for payment against Gibralter Securities without
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-4ever addressing those demands to Lynn Dixon.

The corporation

existed during this period of time when Lynn Dixon was not a
corporate officer.

No evidence was introduced to show that

the corporate entity was the alter ego of Lynn Dixon, but rather
the respondent first sought recovery against the corporation
and then when it could not bring itself within the indernnificatio
provisions of a securities purchaser, and finding the corporation
insolvent, sought recovery against Lynn Dixon whom respondent
characterized in the pleadings as the agent of the corporation.
The respondent has alluded to factors that courts consider
in making judgment as to whether a corporation is the alter ego
of a person, or a mere sham to avoid individual responsibility,
Amoco Chemicals Corp. v. Bach, 222 Kan. 589, 56 7 P. 2d 133 7 (1977)
In that case, the court alluded to the "absence of corporate
records."

Such is not the case before the court.

Gibralter

Securities Corporation was an ongoing enterprise with existence
quite apart from appellant Lynn Dixon.

It had corporate records

in volume, some of which were produced at trial.
a sham enterprise.
below.

This was hardly

This position was not alleged or urged

Respondent cites the above case and others for the

proposition that fraud in the use of the corporation will
justify abandoning the corporate status.

No fraud was ever

alleged in conjunction with respondent's complaint.

Rule

9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
"In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
shall be stated with particularity."
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This provision was not complied with.

General allegations

are not sufficient, Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806,
809 (Utah 1974).

No fraud was either alleged or proved.

Such a contention seems to be an afterthought.

Respondent

would have this Court impose liability against a disclosed
agent simply because of insolvency of the principal.

This

is not the law of agency or responsibility of corporate
agents.

In Shaw v. Bailey-McCune Co., 11 Utah 2d 93, 355

P.2d 321 (1960), this Court affirmed dismissal of an action
against individuals in a suit brought against a corporation
and its officers and shareholders.

In doing so, the Court

stated:
"A corporation is a statutory entity which
is regarded as having an existence and personality distinct from that of its stockholders even though the stock is owned by
a single individual.
Under some circumstances the corporate
entity may be disregarded in the interest
of justice in such cases as fraud, contravention of law or contract, or public wrong.
However, reat caution should be exercised
y t e courts in
ing t e entity.
(Emphasis added)
No finding was made by the trial court that Gibralter Securities
Corporation was a sham or the alter

ego of Lynn Dixon.

No

request for such a finding was made nor would the evidence justify
such a conclusion.

Gibralter Securities existed independent of

Lynn Dixon and therefore cannot be ignored so far as Dixon's
liability is concerned.

Cf. Utah State Bldg. Connnission v. Great

American Indemnity Co., 105 Utah 11, 18, 140 P.2d 763 (1943).
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-6In Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526 (19JJ)
plaintiff brought action against a corporation and its president
to recover the amount allegedly due under an employment contract.
The corporation was in financial difficulty and couldn't meet
the plaintiff's contract.

In reversing the trial court's

judgment against the corporate president who had allegedly
negotiated the contract, this Court stated:
"The term 'alter ego' is used to describe
a situation where the courts go behind the
corporate entity and hold a stockholder liable
for the debts of the corporation or to hold that
it is the stockholder and not the corporation
which owns the assets.
The doctrine is generally applied to situations
known as 'one-man corporations,' i.e., where one
man owns practically all of the stock, either
directly or through others who hold it for his
use and benefit, and where the stockholder uses
the corporation as a shield to protect him
from debts or wrongdoings. It cannot be applied
to make a stockholder liable for the legitimate
debts of a corporation unless he is so closely
allied with the corporation through ownership
and management as to enable the courts to see
clearly that the corporate entity is but a sham
and it is the stockholder who is doing business
behind the corporate shield.
In the instant matter it is not shown that
Walker owns a majority of the stock of either
corporation of which he was president."
Most recently, in Centurian Corp. v. Fiber Chem, Inc., 562P
1252 (Utah 1977), this Court rejected a contention that defend~t
could apply monies received against a corporate indebtedness for
a corporation claimed to be the alter ego of the plaintiff.
The Court stated that the trial court had not found facts to
fit the defense.

The Court noted that in order for the alter

ego doctrine to apply there must be "something akin to fraud
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-7or deception which thus placed defendant at a disadvantage
and worked an injustice."

In the instant case, no fraud was

plead, no fraud was established.

Testimony before the trial

court was only that Lynn Dixon as an agent for Gibralter
Securities Corporation received monies in conjunction with a
stock sale which because of Gibralter's insolvency the return
funds on the stock sale could not be paid to plaintiff.
It is apparent that respondent had no claim for relief
either under a theory of liability of Lynn Dixon as an agent
for Gibralter Securities Corporation or under a theory that
Lynn Dixon should be liable as the alter ego of Gibralter
Securities Corporation.

The facts of the case disclose

no basis for the trial court's judgment.
POINT II
THE RESPONDENT COULD NOT HOLD APPELLANT LIABLE
WHERE APPELLANT WAS AN ACKNOWLEDGED AGENT OF A
KNOWN PRINCIPAL.
The appellant in its initial brief asserts that the trial
court improperly used appellant's inability to produce
record evidence as affirmative evidence of the validity of
the respondent's claim.

The appellant in its initial brief

has shown that such action by the trial judge was improper.
First, it appears that appellant was, at the time of the
suit, not connected with Gibralter.

Appellant, Lynn Dixon,

did arrange for the production of what records there were of
the transaction.

See Testimony of Lois Crowder (Tr. 76).

There was no showing that any other specific and relevant
records existed.

Dixon took the stand and testified fully

as toby the
the
The fortrial
court
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-8the appellant with the burden of proof apparently treating a
claim of non-production as affin:lative evidence against
appellant.

As is shown in the appellant's brief such

application of the rule on failure to produce relevant
competent evidence is error.

The trial court went beyond

merely using the facts as inference.

Nor was an inference

justified since there is no showing of "actual suppression"
by Dixon.

Cf. 31 C.J.S. Evidence, § 156(b) cited p. 16

respondent's bri8f.

In the same section, p. G53, it is

observed:
"Inferences from the suppression of documents or
failure to produce them on notice increase the
weight of evidence produced by the other party
as to the contents of the documents, or as to the
facts to which the documents are relevant, but do
not constitute independent evidence of a face."
Thus the trial court went beyond the permissible rule.
The respondent relies on Rasbury v. Bainum, 15 Utah 2d 62,
387 P.2d 239 (1963) and Tucker v. Nunley, 16 Utah 2d 97, 396 P.Zd

440 (1964).

Neither case is in point, each case deals with a

willful failure to make discovery justifying the trial court in
either striking the errant party's cause of action or imposing
default.

This was not the action requested by respondent nor tak

1

by the trial court.
Even so, the respondent would not be entitled to judgment
if the facts as known and plead by respondent show no legal basis
for relief.

In this case respondent plead the agency of Dixon,

all the facts show that Dixon was acting in an agency relationshiJ
with Gibralter Securities.

Woolley of Royal Resources had a

pattern of dealing with Gibralter, he acted and understood
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-9that he was dealing with Gibralter.

Woolley made demand for

payment on Gibralter and not upon Dixon.

The money that

respondent was entitled to was from the sale of stock of a
client of Gibralter and not a personal obligation of Dixon.
Therefore, in spite of any lack of discovery, Royal Resources
was not entitled to relief against Lynn Dixon.
Further, appellant asserts that any claim against Dixon
was barred by respondent taking judgment against Gibralter
and seeking Dixon's aid in satisfaction of that judgment
against SCIPIC in Gibralter's name.

Only when it appeared

that no claim against SCIPIC would satisfy the judgment did
respondent then actively pursue Dixon.

Appellant in his

initial brief shows that under these circumstances that
judgment was barred against Dixon.
§

Restatement of Contract

119(1).
Even so, since an agent is not liable for the duties

and obligations of the principal under such circumstances
judgment against Dixon would not otherwise be proper.

See

Point I, Appellant's Brief.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the respondent's
arguments raised in opposition to the appellant's points on
appeal demonstrate that the judgment below should be reversed.
The respondent's contention that liability should be imposed
against appellant under a theory of piercing the corporate
veil is neither legally or factually well founded.

The
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respondent's contentions as to the application of the law on
a claimed failure of appellant to produce documents is
neither procedurally or conceptually proper.

An analysis of

the cases and theories raised by respondent in answer to the
appellant's complaints of error in the trial below make it
apparent that under the facts and law applicable to this
case the judgment entered by the trial court was erroneous.
This Court should reverse.
Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD J. LEEDY
610 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Appellant Lynn Dixon
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